Abstract-This work considers resilient, cooperative state estimation in unreliable multi-agent networks. A network of agents aims to collaboratively estimate the value of an unknown vector parameter, while an unknown subset of agents suffer Byzantine faults. Faulty agents malfunction arbitrarily and may send out highly unstructured messages to other agents in the network. As opposed to fault-free networks, reaching agreement in the presence of Byzantine faults is far from trivial. In this paper, we propose a computationally-efficient algorithm that is provably robust to Byzantine faults. At each iteration of the algorithm, a good agent (1) performs a gradient descent update based on noisy local measurements, (2) exchanges its update with other agents in its neighborhood, and (3) robustly aggregates the received messages using coordinate-wise trimmed means. Under mild technical assumptions, we establish that good agents learn the true parameter asymptotically in almost sure sense. We further complement our analysis by proving (high probability) finite-time convergence rate, encapsulating network characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collaborative state/parameter estimation has attracted a considerable attention due to a wide range of applications in internet of things (IoT), wireless networks, power grids, sensor networks, and robotic networks [1] - [7] . In these applications, a network of (connected) agents collect information in a distributed fashion and share an overarching goal to learn the common unknown truth θ * ∈ R d . Local measurements obtained by each individual agent contain noisy and highly incomplete information about θ * . Nevertheless, the network of agents might be able to collaboratively learn θ * by effectively fusing the information contained in their local measurements.
In the absence of system adversary, the state estimation problem is well-studied [5] , [8] . However, some practical scenarios such as IoT, micro-grids, and Federated Learning are vulnerable to faults [9] . Motivated by that, we are interested in addressing collaborative estimation in the presence of malicious agents. The existence of malicious agents might arise when some of the networked agents are compromised by a system adversary. Despite the wealth of literature on collaborative estimation with random link failures, packet-dropping failures, and crash failures (e.g. [10] ), perhaps less wellknown is estimation in the presence of highly unstructured failures or even adversarial agents, especially in finite-time domain.
In this work, to formally capture the unstructured system threat, we adopt Byzantine fault model [11] a canonical fault model in distributed computing. In this model, there exists a system adversary that can choose up to a constant fraction of agents to compromise and control. An agent suffering Byzantine fault behaves arbitrarily badly by sending out unstructured malicious messages to the good agents. In addition, Byzantine agents may give conflicting messages to different agents in the system. Tolerating Byzantine faults is highly nontrivial (see e.g. [12] , [13] ). For example, it is wellknown that in complete graphs, no algorithm can tolerate more than 1/3 of the agents to be Byzantine [13] . This difficulty arises partially from the system asymmetry caused by the conflicting messages sent by the Byzantine agents. In fact, Byzantine consensus with vector multidimensional inputs in the complete graphs had not been solved until only recently [14] , [15] .
Despite intensive efforts on securing distributed learning (see Section I-B for details), to the best of the authors' knowledge, efficient algorithms that are provably resilient to Byzantine faults with less stringent assumptions on noisy local measurements are still lacking. In particular, the literature has mostly focused on the asymptotic analysis, leaving the finite-time guarantees for such algorithms a complementary direction to pursue, which is the main focal point of this work.
A. Our Contributions
We propose a computationally-efficient algorithm that is provably robust to Byzantine faults. At each iteration of our algorithm, a good agent (1) performs a gradient descent update based on local measurements only, (2) exchanges its update with other agents in its neighborhood, and (3) robustly aggregates the received messages using coordinate-wise trimmed means.
For ease of exposition, we first present our results for fully connected networks (complete graphs), and then generalize the obtained results to general networks (incomplete graphs) assuming that the networks satisfy the necessary conditions such that Byzantine-resilient consensus with scalar inputs can be achievable. For both cases, we establish that every good agent learns the true parameter asymptotically in the almost sure sense. Most importantly, we characterize the finite-time convergence rate (in high-probability sense), encapsulating network characteristics. We finally provide numerical simulations for our method to verify our theoretical results.
B. Related Literature
Resilient estimation, detection, and learning has attracted a great deal of attention in the past few years, and many researchers in the fields of control, signal processing, and network science have addressed the problem by adopting different notions of resilience or robustness.
In [16] - [18] , resilience has been discussed in the context of smart power grid systems using cardinality minimization and its ℓ 1 relaxations. On the other hand, the focus of [19] , [20] is on estimation in Linear TimeInvariant (LTI) systems. In [19] , an interesting approach is proposed for fault detection using monitors, and fundamental monitoring limitations have been characterized using tools from system theory and game theory. Furthermore, the approach of [20] is inspired from the areas of error-correction over the reals and compressed sensing. In [21] , robust Kalman filtering is discussed, where the estimate updates are derived using a convex ℓ 1 optimization problem. Authors of [22] consider a model where the observation noise is sparse, in the sense that the faulty sensors have noisy measurements, while other sensors measurements are noiseless. An event triggered projected gradient descent is then proposed to reconstruct the state. In our setting, though the state is fixed, we deal with multi-agent networks, i.e., the problem must be solved in a distributed manner since each agent has local (noisy) measurements from the state, and message passing schemes (e.g. consensus) are required to learn the state.
In parallel to advancements on resilient centralized estimation, recent years have witnessed intensive interest in securing distributed estimation. The authors of [23] discuss reaching consensus in the presence of malicious agents, assuming a broadcast model of communication. Chen et al. [24] propose a novel adversary detection strategy under which good agents either asymptotically learn the true state or detect the existence of a system fault. If a fault is flagged, the system goes through some external procedure to "repair" itself. As a result, the method does not perform estimation under system adversary (which is the focus of this paper). Furthermore, other resilient algorithms have been proposed [25] - [29] with different assumptions and performance guarantees.
Chen et al. [25] propose an algorithm under which all of the agents' estimates converge to the true state as long as less than one half of the agents are faulty. However, this algorithm works under the assumption that an agent can fully observe the true state in the non-faulty condition [25, Section II.A], as opposed to our model which deals with both observability and noisy measurement issues. Mitra and Sundaram [26] consider the more general LTI systems and characterize the fundamental limits on adversary-resilient algorithms. However, unlike our work, [26] deals with noiseless observations and the focus is on asymptotic analysis. Xu et al. [27] study the general dynamic optimization problem. They propose a total variation (TV) norm regularization technique to mitigate the effect of malfunctioning agents, but unfortunately, in the static case, the good agents cannot learn the true minimizer (see Corollary 1 in [27] ). In fact, [27, Assumption 4] might not hold in the sense that under some strategies of the adversary agents, some good agents may appear to be bad to others, and the outgoing links from those agents might be cut off by the good agents. The lack of convergence in this case is consistent with the lower bound result in [30] .
Another relevant work is the distributed hypothesis testing of [28] where the algorithm Byz-Iter is proposed. Though this algorithm may work for the state estimation problem, it scales poorly in dimension. Our algorithm is similar to [29] in that we both combine local gradient descent with coordinate-wise message trimming. Although [29] considers a more general optimization framework, it is implicitly assumed that the optimization problem can be separated into independent optimization problems (of the size of unknown parameter); otherwise, [29, Lemma 1] does not hold and the proof in [30] cannot be applied.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Network Model
We consider a multi-agent network which is a collection of n agents/nodes communicating with each other through a communication network G(V, E), where V = {1, · · · , n} and E denote the set of nodes and edges, respectively. We denote by N i the set of incoming neighbors of agent i. An unknown subset of agents of size at most b, denoted by A, might be bad or adversarial. The set A is chosen by the system adversary. For ease of exposition, let
Good agents (agents in V/A) aim to estimate the unknown parameter collaboratively, but bad agents (agents in A) can adversarially affect the estimation procedure by sending completely arbitrary, malicious, and possibly conflicting messages to the good agents.
B. Observation Model
In this work, we focus on a linear observation model, where y i (t) represents the local measurement of agent i at time t as follows
and H i ∈ R ni×d is the local observation matrix. The noise sequence w i (t) is i.i.d. with E [w i (t)] = 0 and E w i (t)w i (t) ⊤ = Σ i . The sequences are bounded for all agents, i.e., there exists constant C > 0 such that P { w i (t) 2 ≤ C} = 1 for i ∈ V. Moreover, the noise sequences across good agents are independent. That is, (w i (t), t ≥ 1) and (w j (t), t ≥ 1) for i = j are independent. As in practice the observation matrix H i is often fat, i.e., n i ≪ d, each agent i must obtain information from others to correctly estimate θ * .
C. Fault Model
To formally capture the system threat, we adopt the Byzantine fault model [11] -a canonical fault model in distributed computing. In this model, there exists a system adversary that can choose up to b of the n agents (where b < n) to compromise and control. Recall that this set of agents is denoted by A. An agent suffering Byzantine fault is referred to as Byzantine agent. While the set A is unknown to good agents, a standard assumption in the literature is that the value of b is common knowledge [11] .
The system adversary is extremely powerful in the sense that it has complete knowledge of the network, including the local program that each good agent is supposed to run, the true value of the parameter θ * , the current status and running history of the multi-agent network system, the running history, etc. Hence, the Byzantine agents can collude with each other and deviate from their pre-specified local programs to arbitrarily misrepresent information to the good agents. In particular, Byzantine agents can mislead each of the good agents in a unique fashion, i.e., letting m ij (t) ∈ R d be the message sent from agent i ∈ A to agent j ∈ V \A at time t, it is possible that m ij (t) = m ij ′ (t) for j = j ′ ∈ V \A.
Remark 1. Note that due to the extreme freedom given to Byzantine agents and the system asymmetry caused by them, a resilient distributed solution to the estimation problem is highly non-trivial even in complete graphs.
In particular, it is well-known that in complete graphs, no algorithm can tolerate more than 1/3 of the agents to be Byzantine [13] .
D. Finite-time vs. Asymptotic Local Functions
The Byzantine-resilient state estimation problem can be viewed with an optimization lens, where each good agent would only asymptotically know its local function. For each agent i ∈ V, define the asymptotic local function
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of w i . Note that f i is well-defined for each i ∈ V regardless of whether it is suffering Byzantine faults or not. Since the distribution of w i is unknown to agent i, at any finite t, function f i is not accessible to agent i. However, the agent has access to the finite-time or empirical local function
whose gradient at x is
III. BYZANTINE-RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION
To robustify distributed state estimation against Byzantine faults, one approach may be to combine the local gradient descent with multi-dimensional Byzantineresilient consensus [14] , [15] , [28] (which typically relies on using Tverberg points). However, the performance of any such algorithm is proved to scale poorly in the dimension of the parameter d [14] , [15] , [28] . This is partially due to the fact that different dimensions of the inputs strongly interfere with each other, and the Byzantine agents can inject wrong information with both extreme magnitudes and directions.
To improve the scalability with respect to d and to improve the computation complexity, instead of multidimensional Byzantine-resilient consensus, we robustly aggregate the received messages using coordinate-wise trimmed means.
A. Algorithm
We propose an algorithm, named Byzantine-resilient state estimation, where each good agent iteratively aggregates the received messages. To robustify, the agent discards the largest b and the smallest b values for each component. In particular, in each iteration, an agent performs the following three steps:
• Local gradient descent: Agent i first computes the noisy local gradient ∇f i,t (x i (t − 1)), and performs local gradient descent to obtain z i (t), i.e.,
Note that the step-size used in this update is 1.
• Information exchange: It exchanges z i (t) with other agents in its local neighborhood. Recall that m ij (t) ∈ R d is the message sent from agent i to agent j at time t. It relates to z i (t) as follows:
where ⋆ denotes an arbitrary value. Byzantine agents can mislead good agents differently, i.e., if i ∈ A, it might hold that m ij (t) = m ij ′ (t) for j = j ′ ∈ V \ A.
• Robust aggregation: For each component k = 1, . . . , d, the agent computes the trimmed mean and uses them to obtain x i (t). The formal description of the algorithm for agent i ∈ V \ A is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Byzantine-resilient state estimation
Input: b and T Initialization: Set x i (0) to an arbitrary value for each agent i ∈ V for t = 1, . . . , T do -Obtain a new measurement y i (t); -Compute the local noisy gradient
-Send z i (t) to its outgoing neighbors; for k = 1, . . . , d do -Sort the k-th component of the received messages m ji (t) for j ∈ N i ∪ {i} in a non-decreasing (increasing) order; -Remove the largest b values and the smallest b values; -Denote the remained "agent" indices set as R k i (t) and set
IV. FINITE-TIME GUARANTEE FOR COMPLETE NETWORKS
In this section, we provide results for the case that G(V, E) is a complete graph. Beside the fact that the technical analysis of complete graphs would be different from that of incomplete graphs (in terms of assumptions), the former is particularity interesting in computer networks. In fact, in many computer networks efficient communication protocols (such as TCP/IP) can be implemented such that any two computer are logically connected.
It can be shown that the update of x i uses the information provided by the good agents only. In addition, each of the good agent has limited impact on x i , formally stated next. Lemma 1. For each iteration t, each good agent i ∈ V/A, and each k, there exist coefficients
Moreover, even for the same k, the convex coefficients might be different for different good agents, i.e., β
′ . This stems from the freedom of Byzantine agents in sending different messages across agents, i.e., m aj = m aj ′ if a ∈ A and j = j ′ . To prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, we use the following assumption. 
The above assumption is imposed for the d components individually. None of the agents are required to
Clearly, ρ < 1 under Assumption 1. For ease of exposition, for each j ∈ V/A and for any λ ∈ (0, 1), let
The following two concentration results are two key auxiliary lemmas for our main theorem. In addition, we characterize the finite-time convergence rate of R j (λ, ·) for any fixed λ.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for each j ∈ V/A and for any λ ∈ (0, 1)
Lemma 3 implies that ∀j ∈ V/A, with probability at 
Moreover, with probability at least
, it holds that
The theorem indicates that all good agents (in a complete graph) are eventually able to learn the true parameter θ * almost surely. Also, with high probability the rate can be characterized as above, providing a finitetime guarantee for resilient estimation. The finite-time bound captures the performance, in terms of Σ j , the noise covariance for agent j ∈ V/A, as well as ρ, which can crudely serve as a measure of observability in view of (5).
V. FINITE-TIME GUARANTEES FOR INCOMPLETE NETWORKS
A. Incomplete Graphs: Multihop Communication
So far, our analysis of Algorithm 1 has focused on complete graphs.
For computer networks, this is a reasonable assumption as computers are connected to each other through some communication (routing) protocols. Our results are also applicable to wireless networks under some implementation assumptions.
Concretely, let G(V, E) be the physical network that is not fully connected. Suppose the networked agents are allowed to relay the messages sent by others such that multi-hop communication can be implemented. We can adopt coding to force the Byzantine agents to either refuse to relay information or faithfully relay the messages without alternation [12] . Thus, as long as the node-connectively of G(V, E) is at least b+1, each good agent can reliably receive messages from other good agents in the network. We can use our algorithm to robust aggregate the received messages and perform one-step update. Similar analysis applies.
B. Incomplete Graphs: Local Communication
Message forwarding might be costly or even infeasible for some wireless networks. Algorithms that rely solely on local communication are still highly desirable. Fortunately, with reasonable assumptions, Algorithm 1 works. Our algorithm is a consensus-based algorithm, so to make the paper self-contained, we briefly review relevant existing results on Byzantine consensus.
1) Byzantine Consensus with Scalar Inputs:
Note that, in contrast to fault-free consensus, Byzantineresilient consensus with scalar inputs and with multidimensional inputs are fundamentally different [14] , [15] , [31] . Our algorithm relies on Byzantine-resilient consensus with scalar inputs.
Tight topological conditions are characterized in [31] , where the conditions are stated in terms of a family of subgraphs of G(V, E). Those subgraphs capture the "real" information flow under the message trimming strategy. Informally speaking, trimming certain messages can be viewed as ignoring (or removing) incoming links that carry the outliers. The non-uniqueness of the subgraph arises partially from the fact that the Byzantine agents can behave adaptively and arbitrarily. Such subgraphs are referred to as reduced graphs, defined as follows.
Definition 1. [31] A reduced graph H of G(V, E) is obtained by (i) removing all faulty nodes A, and all the links incident on the faulty nodes A; and (ii) for each non-faulty node (nodes in V/A), removing up to b additional incoming links.
It is important to note that the non-faulty agents do not know the identities of the faulty agents. Let H be the collection of all reduced graphs of G(V, E), and let ξ := |H| .
Definition 2. A source component in a given reduced graph is a strongly connected component, which does not have any incoming links from outside of that component.
It turns out that the effective communication network is potentially time-varying (partly) due to timevarying behaviors of Byzantine agents. The tight network topology condition for scaler valued consensus to be achievable is characterized in [31] .
Theorem 2. [31] For scalar inputs, iterative approximate Byzantine consensus is achievable among nonfaulty agents if and only if every reduced graph of G(V, E) contains only one source component.
Under the condition in Theorem 2, it follows that in any reduced graph, a node in the source component can reach every other nodes.
2) Correctness of Algorithm 1 for Incomplete Graphs: We will show the correctness of our Algorithm 1 assuming that Byzantine consensus with scalar inputs is achievable over G(V, E), and the following assumption holds.
Assumption 2. For each non-faulty node j ∈ V/A and each
k = 1, · · · , d, I − H ⊤ j H j e k 1 ≤ 1.
In addition, any reduced graph H contains a node in its unique source component such that for all
k = 1, · · · , d, (N i ∪ {i}/A) ∩ j : I − H ⊤ j H j e k 1 < 1 ≥ b + 1.
Note that in Assumption 2, N i is the incoming neighbors of node i in the original graph G(V, E).
Define ρ 0 as
In (7), the maximization
is taken over the non-faulty nodes only.
Similar to the analysis for the complete graphs, it can be shown that the update of x i uses the information provided by its good neighbors only.
Lemma 4. [32, Claim 2] For each iteration t, each good agent i ∈ V/A, and each k, there exist coefficients β
2(|Ni∪{i}/A|−b) for each j ∈ B i (t). In the next theorem, we establish that (under the assumption above) the estimates of all agents are consistent almost surely, and furthermore, we characterize the (high probability) finite-time convergence rate of these estimates.
Theorem 3. Suppose that every reduced graph of G(V, E) contains a single source component, and Assumption 2 holds. Then
ξφ . With probability at least
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We now provide empirical evidence in support of our algorithm. We consider a complete graph of |V \A| = 30 agents. Each component of the unknown parameter θ * ∈ R 50 is generated randomly within the interval [−1, 1] and is fixed thereafter during the estimation process. Moreover, the observation matrices H i ∈ R 20×50 for each i are chosen such that Assumption 1 holds.
Evidently, in this example, n i = 20 for all i. Throughout, the adversarial agents can send out completely arbitrary messages in lieu of true gradients. We generate these arbitrary messages using a random 50-dimensional vector, each component of which is sampled from N (0, 9).
Let us now define the network performance metric as
and plot in Fig. 1 the error for various values of adversarial agents |A| ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 10}. We observe a dichotomy, where for |A| < 7 the error converges to zero, whereas for |A| ≥ 7 the convergence does not occur. Moreover, increase in the number of adversarial agents degrades the performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied resilient distributed estimation, where a network of agents want to learn the value of an unknown parameter in the presence of Byzantine agents. The main challenges in the problem are as follows: (i) Byzantine agents send out arbitrary messages to other agents, (ii) good agents need to deal with noisy measurements, and (iii) the parameter is not locally observable. We proposed an algorithm that allows agents to collectively learn the true parameter asymptotically in almost sure sense, and we further complemented our results with finite-time analysis. Future directions include resilient estimation and learning in a more general setting, where agents observations can be a nonlinear function of the unknown parameter. Another interesting direction is to investigate the minimal condition needed on the local observation matrices of the good agents for the problem to be solvable.
APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove this lemma by construction. Note that this construction is only used in the algorithm analysis rather than an algorithm input. That is, to run the algorithm, each agent (either good or faulty) does not need to know β.
For ease of exposition, let [R
− be the non-overlapping subsets of V whose gradient's k-th entry are trimmed away by agent i. Precisely,
We consider two cases:
We construct the convex coefficients as follows: Case 1-1: When |A| = b, we have φ − b = n − 2b. We choose the convex coefficients as
Clearly, in this construction, β
and
By (8), we have
Thus, there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that 1 n − 2b
Note that 1 n − 2b
where equality (a) follows from (11) . Choose the convex coefficients for the good agents as follows:
The fact that α is unknown does not affect our correctness proof -as our algorithm not use these coefficients as input. We use the existence of α for analysis. It is easy to see that the above coefficients are valid convex coefficients. It remains to check that β
− /A, by (10) and the fact that α ≤ 1, we have
Similarly, we can show β
+ /A. Case 2 can be proved similarly.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let ω be any sample path such that lim t→∞ 1 t t r=1 w j (r, ω) = 0. Note that fixing ω, w j (t, ω) for t = 1, · · · is a standard sequence of vectors. We will show that
By Strong Law of Large Number we know that
Thus, if (12) Next we show (12) . It is enough to show that for any ǫ > 0, there exists t ≥ t(ǫ, ω) such that
Since lim t→∞ 1 t t r=1 w j (r, ω) = 0, for any
, there exists t 0 (ǫ, ω) such that for any t ≥ t 0 (ǫ, ω),
In addition, for any t ≥ t 0 (ǫ, ω), it holds that
There exists a sufficiently large t(ǫ, ω) such that
Thus, it holds that for this fixed sample path ω, for any ǫ > 0, there exists t(ǫ, ω) such that for all t ≥ t(ǫ, ω)
proving (13) .
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Our proof uses the McDiarmid's inequality. We first bound the expectation of R j (λ, t).
where equality (a) follows from Jensen's inequality. Recall that w j (r) for r = 1, · · · , t − m are independent and E [w j (r)] = 0 for each r = 1, · · · , t − m. Thus, for any j ∈ V/A, we have
So we get
We choose h as
It can be shown that we can choose c r to be
. It is easy to see that m 0 ≤ t 2 unless t is extremely small. For simplicity, assume that log λt 2 log 1 λ is an integer. So we have
It is easy to see that c r ≤ c 1 for all r = 1, · · · , t. So we have
By McDiarmid's Inequality we have
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 For each t, x i (t) can be uniquely rewritten as
where
It follows from Lemma 1 that
Recall from (3) and (4), for each k = 1, · · · , d, we have
Thus, (14) becomes
By Lemma 1, we have
For the second term, we have
where the last equality follows from the fact that I − H ⊤ j H j is symmetric. For the first term, we have
By Assumption 1, we have
By Lemmas 2 and 3 with λ = ρ, we complete the proof.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first show that the evolution of x i (t) − θ * ∞ -the ℓ ∞ norm of the estimation errors -for all i ∈ V/A collectively have a matrix representation. Then we bound the convergence rate of the obtained matrix product.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, for any i ∈ V/A and any k, we have
For the first term, we have Let E(t) ∈ R φ be the vector that stacks the ℓ ∞ norm of the errors x i (t) − θ * for all i ∈ V/A. For each i ∈ V/A, define matrix M (t) as follows: Note that M (t) is random, and its realization is determined by both the noises in the good agents' local observations and the Byzantine agents' adversarial behaviors. Nevertheless, this does not complicate our analysis because our analysis works for every realization of M (t). Henceforth, with a little abuse of notation, we use M (t) to denote both the random matrix and its realization. By Lemma 4 and Assumption 2, we know that for every t, the matrix M (t) is a strict sub-stochastic matrix. In particular, under the assumptions in Theorem 3, the following claim is true. For ease of exposition, the proof of Claim 1 is deferred to the end of this paper.
With Claim 1, for any fixed t 0 and for sufficiently large t − t 0 , we have In addition, by applying Lemma 3 with λ = γ
